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AbstractWe construct an elementary mechanism (Dutta, Sen and Vohra
(1995)) that Nash implements the Constrained Walrasian correspondence.
We extend it to incomplete and non-exclusive information economies by en-
larging the message space of agents. We characterize the set of Bayesian
equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism, and thus characterize an exten-
sion of the Constrained Walrasian correspondence when one switches from
complete to incomplete information. First, measurability restrictions on al-
locations do not emerge from the strategic behavior of agents: there exist
simple economies for which the set of Constrained Rational Expectations
equilibrium allocations is not contained in the set of equilibrium outcomes of
the mechanism. Next, by imposing measurability restrictions on allocations,
the mechanism globally implements the Constrained Rational Expectations
Equilibrium correspondence. This result shows game-theoretic connections
between these two market equilibrium concepts. However, it is obtained at
the price of strong restrictions on the behavior of agents.
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1 Introduction
The goal of implementation theory is to design institutions that elim-
inate strategic manipulations on part of the agents in order to implement
desirable allocation rules. For instance, suppose a planner is interested in
implementing Walrasian allocations. Some characteristics of the economy
being unknown to her (e.g., preferences), her task is to provide adequate in-
centives to the agents so that, given an appropriate solution concept, every
equilibrium outcome of the mechanism is a Walrasian allocation.
Using an implementation approach, we want to understand the connec-
tions between (constrained) Walrasian Equilibrium and (constrained) Ratio-
nal Expectations Equilibrium (henceforth CWE and CREE, respectively).12
Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) show that in economies with non-exclusive
information, risk-averse agents, strictly positive and state-independent en-
dowments, the REE correspondence is globally implementable in Bayesian
equilibrium. Wettstein (1990) constructs a continuous mechanism that im-
plements CREE allocations in Bayesian equilibrium in non-exclusive infor-
mation environments. However, in contrast with Bayesian implementation
literature, the play of his game does not take place entirely at the interim
stage. Both papers restrict attention to economies with non-exclusive dif-
ferential information (henceforth NEI). Blume and Easley (1990) show that
if NEI is not satised, one can construct a robust example of an economy
with a unique REE that is not incentive-compatible. Hence, we consider
non-exclusive di¤erential information environments.
Our work is related to papers on implementation of WE and REE. How-
ever, our approach is di¤erent. We start by designing a mechanism that
implements CWE allocations in Nash equilibrium. Our construction falls in
the attractive class of elementary mechanisms, as dened in Dutta, Sen and
1See, for instance, Radner (1979).
2The di¤erence between Walrasian equilibria (respectively Rational expectations equi-
libria) and Constrained Walrasian equilibria (respectively Constrained Rational expecta-
tions equilibria) is that in the latter, agents maximize their utility with respect to con-
strained budget sets which exclude bundles that exceed the aggregate endowment. As a
consequence, every Walrasian equilibrium (respectively Rational expectations equilibrium)
is a Constrained Walrasian equilibrium (respectively Constrained Rational expectations
equilibria) but the converse is obviously not true.
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Vohra (1995), and is very similar to their construction.34 Elementary mech-
anisms are an answer to what sort of message spaces are needed in order
to implement the (constrained) Walrasian correspondence. The mechanism
we use is based on the Walrasian notion of allocation and prices and ts
the Walrasian story. The question that comes to mind is how this mecha-
nism that performed well for a particular information structure and for a
large class of economieswould work in di¤erential information economies?
This approach has been followed in a context di¤erent than ours by Dubey,
Geanakopolos and Shubik (1987), Forges and Minelli (1997), or more re-
cently Codognato and Ghosal (2003). These authors extend the well-known
Shapley-Shubik strategic market games (see Shapley and Shubik (1977)) to
di¤erential information economies.5 In particular, Forges and Minelli (1997)
obtain that when there is a continuum of agents of nitely many types and
some other assumptions, REE can be obtained as particular communication
equilibria of the Shapley-Shubik market game.6 A di¤erent line of research on
decentralized trading procedures studies also the game-theoretic connections
between WE and REE, and the strategic foundations of REE. For instance,
see Gale (1987), Wolinsky (1990), or more recently Serrano (2002) as well as
Gottardi and Serrano (2005).7
The question of the game-theoretic connections between WE and REE
and the strategic foundations of REE is of importance. In fact, the extension
of the concept of WE to the case of incomplete information is not yet fully
understood. REE has been proposed as an extension and counterpart of the
notion of competitive equilibrium to economies with di¤erential information.
8 It is the purpose of this paper like the ones cited aboveto try to under-
stand the game-theoretic connections between these two market equilibrium
3It is well-known that the Walrasian correspondence violates in general Maskin
monotonicity (Maskin, 1999), a necessary condition for Nash implementation when corner
allocations are possible. Instead of restricting the domain of economies and ruling out
corner Walrasian allocations, we consider the Constrained Walrasian correspondence.
4Thereafter, we will make use of DSV to refer to Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995).
5Dubey, Geanakopolos and Shubik use a bids-o¤ers market game while Forges and
Minelli use a bids only market game. Codognato and Ghosal use a variant of the bids only
market game in which it is not assumed that one specic commodity is used as money.
6Formally, the class of communication equilibria they study is called Self-fullling equi-
libria.
7Although his model deals with a situation of complete information, his results extends
to di¤erential economies with private values.
8See Radner (1979), among others.
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concepts. In our context, by extending an elementary mechanism to di¤eren-
tial information settings, we would like to provide an answer to the following
questions:
1) What is the extension of the set of equilibrium outcomes that one
obtains in that case?
2) Is the extension related to the concept of competitive equilibrium?
3) Is the set of CREE allocations at leasta subset of the set of Bayesian
equilibrium outcomes?
4) Is it possible to obtain and under what conditionsthe CREE corre-
spondence as an extension of the CWE correspondence?
We extend our mechanism from complete to incomplete information by
enlarging the message space of agents. We characterize the set of Bayesian
equilibrium outcomes of the extended mechanism and thus propose an exten-
sion of the Walrasian correspondence for di¤erential information economies.
We nd that equilibrium allocation rules are expected utility maximizing over
(constrained) state-contingent budget sets generated by prices reported by
agents and individual endowments. The rst main result of the paper shows
that despite its similitude withWE and REE, the set of Bayesian Equilibrium
outcomes of the mechanism does not always contain the set of CREE alloca-
tions.9 Incorporating measurability of allocations with respect to prices, in
the outcome function, imposes strong restrictions on the behavior of agents.
By doing so, the mechanism globally implements the Constrained REE cor-
respondence. This shows that connections between CWE and CREE can
be obtained. However, the impact of this result is mitigated by the strong
restrictions incorporated in the outcome function.
The plan of the paper is the following. In section 2, we present the model
and the result for complete information as a benchmark for the understand-
ing of section 3. In section 3, we extend the presentation of the model to
economies with di¤erential information and present the main results. Finally,
we provide some nal comments in section 4.
2 Complete Information
Before presenting the main results, we rst introduce the mechanism as a
benchmark for the next section. The mechanism we use falls in the class
9Namely, there exists economies for which the set of CREE allocations is not achievable
as Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the mechanism.
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of elementary mechanisms dened by DSV (1995). Elementary mechanisms
require the minimum amount of information necessary in order to implement
allocations that are always at leaste¢ cient. We rst describe the class of
exchange economies we consider. We then briey recall the denition of a
game form and of a Nash equilibrium.
There a l innitely divisible goods and a set of agents N = f1; :::; ng,
n  3. The consumption set of each agent i 2 N is Xi = Rl+. Preferences
of each agent i 2 N is represented by a utility function ui : Xi ! R. The
endowment of each agent i 2 N is10 !i > 0. The aggregate endowment is
denoted by !  0.
The only characteristics unknown to the planner are the utility functions.
Individual endowments and the consumption sets of agents are known and
xed. Hence, only the preferences of agents vary. An economy E is simply a
prole of utility functions, one for each agent. More formally, E = (ui)i2N .
Denote by E the class of economies in which, for each agent i 2 N , ui is
continuous, strictly increasing and quasi-concave.
A (feasible) allocation is a list of bundles x = (xi)i2N 2 Rln+ such thatP
xi  !. Formally, the set of feasible allocations is,
A = fx 2 Rln+ :
X
i2N
xi  !g.
Dene P = Rl++ to be the set of strictly positive price vectors. For each
agent i 2 N , denote by Bi(p)  Xi the budget set at a given price p.
Bi(p) = fxi 2 Xi j p  xi  p  !ig .
We denote by Bi(p)jxi! the constrained budget set of agent i at p, that
is the set of bundles that are both in the budget set Bi(p) and that do not
exceed the aggregate endowment !.
Denition 1: A constrained Walrasian equilibrium is a pair (p; x) 2
Rl+Rln+ with
P
i x

i = ! and such that for each i 2 N , xi 2 argmax
xi2Bi(p)jxi!
ui
A normal game form or mechanism is dened as   = (M; g), where M =Q
iMi is the message space and g : M ! A, is an outcome function that
associates a feasible allocation with each path of play. Fixing the game
10We will order vectors with the ususal conventions , >, .
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( ; E), the payo¤ that each player i 2 N receives after m being played is
ui(g(m)
i). A Nash equilibrium of ( ; E) is a strategy prole m 2 M such
that for every i 2 N
ui(g(m
)i)  ui(g(m0i;m i)i) 8m0i 2Mi.
The set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of ( ; E) is denotedNE( ; E). The set
of CWE allocations of a given economy E is denoted CW (E). A normal game
form   is said to implement in Nash equilibrium the constrained Walrasian
correspondence if
NE( ; E) = CW (E) 8E 2 E .
We are now ready to dene the mechanism we use.
The mechanism  :
Agents simultaneously announce the triple11 (x; p; n)i 2 A P  N.
The outcome function is described as follows:
Rule 1 : If for each i 2 N , (x; p)i = (x; p), p  xi = p  !i 8i 2 N andP
i xi = !, then x is implemented.
Rule 2 : If (x; p)j = (x; p) 8j 6= i?  where i? = min fi 2 N : ni  nj 8j 2 Ng
and if (x; p) satises the conditions presented in rule 1, pi
?
= p; xi
? 6= x,
p  xi?i? = p  !i? and xi?i?  !; then agent i? gets xi?i?, the others j 6= i? get 0.
Rule 3 : For all other cases, everybody receives their endowment, except
agent k? = max

k 2 N : nk  nj 8j 2 N	 who receives 0.
Notice that the mechanism is wasteful if agents do not agree on the re-
port of a price and allocation. Indeed, in equilibrium, only rule 1 produces
equilibrium outcome. The outcome function could be modied in order to
be less wasteful. Doing so would complicate the analysis without adding any
additional insights.
Proposition 1: The normal form mechanism   implements the Con-
strained Walrasian correspondence in Nash Equilibrium in the class of economies
E.
Proof : See appendix.
11Where N is the set of positive integer.
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3 REE as an extension of WE?
3.1 Extending the Model
The structure is as in the previous section. Incomplete information is cap-
tured by the use of types. Denote by Ti the nite set of types of player i.
T i =
Q
j 6=i Tj is the Cartesian product of the set of types of players other
than player i. Dene T =
Q
i Ti to be the set of possible type proles. We
denote by T ?  T the set of states occurring with positive probability. A
state of the world is a collection of types t = (t1; t2; ::::; tn). A state summa-
rizes agents preferences and information. Thus preferences may vary across
states and may be state dependent. Each agent has a prior probability dis-
tribution on states of the world qi, dened on T . Obviously, agents agree on
0 probability states, i.e. if qi(t) = 0 for some i 2 N , then qj(t) = 0 8j 6= i.
The set of all such states is TnT ?. We make the following assumption on
information structures.
Assumption 1: Information is non-exclusive
8t 2 T ?, @t0i 2 Ti with t0i 6= ti such that t0 = (t1; ::; ti 1; t0i; ti+1; ::; tn) 2 T ?.
Assumption 2: No redundant type.
8i 2 N , 8ti 2 Ti, 9t i 2 T i such that qi(ti; t i) > 0.
Consumptions sets and individual endowments are state-independent and
known to the planner. Hence, the set of feasible allocation is constant across
states. In the class of economies E , only the utility functions and the type of
the consumers vary. In E , the Bernoulli utility function of each agent i 2 N
in each state t 2 T , ui(; t), continuous, strictly increasing and quasi-concave.
More formally, ui : Rl+T ! R+. An economy with di¤erential information
is dened as E = f(ui; qi; Ti)i2Ng.
Denition 2: The environment is of private values if every agent is
informationally autonomous. More formally,
8i 2 N;8t 2 T , ui(; t) = ui(; ti)
Since information is non-exclusive, the mechanism can determine out-
comes when the state reported is s =2 T ?. In the mechanism, agents will be
restricted to announce allocations over states occurring with positive prob-
ability. A (feasible) state-contingent allocation (over states occurring with
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positive probability) x : T ? ! A is a list of allocation, one for each state
t 2 T ?, where x = (x1; x2; :::::; xn) such that
P
xi(t)  ! for each t 2 T ?.
Denote by A the set of (ex-post) feasible state-contingent allocations dened
over T ?,
A = fx : T ? ! Ag
Dene by P the set of state-contingent strictly positive price vectors 
dened over states occurring with positive probability, with element p =
(pt; pt0 ; :::). For every i 2 N; denote by Bi(pt)  Xi the budget set of agent
i, at a given price pt.
Bi(pt) = fxi 2 Xi : pt  xi  pt  !ig .
Denition 3:
Following Holmström-Myerson (1983), we recall the e¢ ciency concepts
useful for the paper.
. An allocation x 2 A is ex-post e¢ cient if there does not exist another
allocation y 2 A such that ui(y(t); t)  ui(x(t); t) 8i 2 N and 8t, with a
strict inequality for at least one pair (i; t).
. An allocation x 2 A is interim e¢ cient if there does not exist another
allocation y 2 A such that Ui(yjti)  Ui(xjti) 8i 2 N , 8ti 2 Ti, with strict
inequality for at least one pair (i; ti).
Denition 4:
A Constrained Rational Expectation Equilibrium (dened over states t 2
T ?) is a pair (p; x) such that:
1) pt  xi (t)  pt  !i 8t 2 T ?;8i 2 N
2) The nal allocation is measurable with respect to the information that
agents hold. That is, for every agent i and every ti:
p(t i;ti) = p

(t0 i;ti)
=) xi (t i; ti) = xi (t0 i; ti)
3)
P
t i2T i
qi(t ijti)ui(xi (t i; ti); ti) 
P
t i2T i
qi(t ijti)ui(yi(t i; ti); ti), 8i 2
N; 8ti 2 Ti and for every measurable yi such that yi(t) 2 Bi(pt )jyi(t)! 8t 2
T ?.
4)
P
i2N x

i (t) = ! 8t 2 T ?.
Denition 5: A deception for agent i is a mapping i : Ti ! Ti. The
interpretation is that when agent i is of type ti, he acts (or report) as if he
was of type i(ti). Notice that by the denition of i, it is possible that
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i(ti) = ti, i.e. agent i reports truthfully her type. Truthtelling is just the
identity mapping and is denoted ^. We denote by (t) = (1(t1); :::; n(tn))
a collection of deception strategies. Thus, a prole of deception generates
the mapping  : T ! T . Dene x = x   = (x((t)); x((t0)); :::); that is,
x  (t) = x((t)).
Denition 6: Dene by X = fx : T ! Ag the set of all social choice
functions. A social choice set F is a subset of X. Since information is
non-exclusive and the mechanism denes outcomes in the event that an in-
compatible report of a state s =2 T ? occurs, we restrict attention to X? =
fx : T ? ! Ag. In that case X? = A.
Denition 7: A social choice correspondence F : E ! 2X dened on
the domain E is a set-valued function which assigns to every economy E in
E a social choice set. F is said to be globally implementable in Bayesian
equilibrium relative to E if, for all E 2 E , F(E) is Bayesian implementable.
Again, we restrict attention to F? : E ! 2X? because of NEI.
The play of the game takes place at the interim stage. Agents know their
own type. The interim expected utility of each agent i 2 N , when of type
ti 2 Ti, is
Ui( j ti)=
X
t i2T i
qi(t i j ti)ui(; (t i; ti))
A game form, or mechanism, is an array   = (M; g), where M =
Q
iMi
is a message space and g : M ! A an outcome function that associates a
feasible bundle to each agent, for every prole of message m 2 M that is
played. For each agent i 2 N , the set Mi is the set of all possible messages
he can announce. The di¤erence with the previous section is that each agent
i 2 N chooses messages mi as a function of his types. We call a mapping
i : Ti ! Mi a strategy for agent i and i his set of strategies. Given
a strategy prole  = (1; :::; n) with (t) = (1(t1); :::; n(tn)), g() =
fg((t); g((t0); :::g represents the allocation rule which results when  is
played. Suppose the strategy prole  is played. Let g()i stand for bundles
obtained by consumer i at the allocations prescribed by the path induced by
, that is, g(). Fixing the game ( ; E), the payo¤ that each player i 2 N
receives after  being played is (ex-post), in state t, ui(g((t))i; t).
A Bayesian equilibrium of a game with incomplete information is a prole
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of strategies ((i(ti))i2N;ti2Ti), such that, for each i 2 N , each ti 2 Ti,
Ui(g()
ijti)  Ui(g(0i;  i)ijti) 80i 2 i.
The set of Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of ( ; E) is denoted BE( ; E).
The set of CREE allocations of a given economy E is denoted CREE(E). A
normal game form   is said to globally implement in Bayesian equilibrium
the constrained REE correspondence if
BE( ; E) = CREE(E) 8E 2 E .
3.2 Extending the mechanism: achievability of CREE
The message space of agents is enlarged to include report of private informa-
tion, state-contingent allocations and prices for states occurring with positive
probability. Since the environment is of non-exclusive information, incentive
compatibility is indeed still a necessary condition but is vacuously satised.
To see this, notice that we have to pay attention to the collection of types
that are reported. Since T ?  T , it is possible that the collective report
of types is incompatible. The planner knows that if the agents collectively
report state t, then t is either in T ? or in TnT ?. An obvious feature of non-
exclusive information environment is that if t 2 T ? has been reported, then
any unilateral deviation in type by an agent would result in an incompatible
report t0 =2 T ?. Since incompatible reports can be detected, incentive com-
patibility is easily satised. For instance, in case of an incompatible report,
the planner may conscate the aggregate endowment.
We briey summarize some welfare properties and the nature of CREE
dened over the class of economies E . Examples can be found in the ap-
pendix: CREE allocations may not be ex-post individually rational, state-
by-state- Walrasian or interim e¢ cient. However, in private values environ-
ments, every CREE allocation is ex-post individually rational and state-by-
state Walrasian.
The mechanism  :
Agents simultaneously announce the quadruple (x; p; n; ti)i 2 AP 
NTi.
The outcome function is described as follows:
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Rule 1 : If the collection of types reported s is compatible12, (x; p)i =
(x; p) 8i 2 N , pt  xi(t) = pt  !i 8i 2 N , 8t 2 T ? and
P
i xi(t) = ! 8t 2 T ?,
then x(s) is implemented.
Rule 2 : If the collection of types s reported is compatible, if (x; p)j =
(x; p) 8j 6= i? where i? = min fi 2 N : ni  nj 8j 2 Ng and if (x; p) satises
the conditions presented in rule 1, pi
?
= p, xi
? 6= x, pt xi?i?(t) = pt !i? 8t 2 T ?
and xi
?
i?(t)  ! 8t 2 T ?; then agent i? gets xi?i?(s), agents j 6= i? get 0 (and
the rest of the goods is thrown away).
Rule 3 : For all other cases, everybody receives their endowment, except
agent k? = max

k 2 N : nk  nj 8j 2 N	 who receives 0.
We characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes. It is a natural extension
of the set of equilibrium outcomes obtained for the complete information
case. Suppose  is a Bayesian Equilibrium such that i(ti) = (x; p; n; i(ti))i
8i 2 N , 8ti 2 Ti and g() = a.
Proposition 2: The characterization of equilibrium outcomes is such
that:
1) Every equilibrium outcome is given by rule 1.
2) For every compatible deception  ( = ^ or  6= ^), for every agent,
x is expected-utility maximizing over the Constrained budget sets generated
by p and individual endowments.
3) Moreover, when the environment is of private values, x is state-by-
state Walrasian
Proof: The proof of the proposition is divided in a series of lemma.
Lemma 4 and 5 prove the rst part of the proposition. Lemma 6 and 7
prove respectively the second and third part of the proposition.
Lemma 4: For every  ( = ^ or  6= ^), there does not exists t 2 T ?
such that a((t)) comes from rule 3
Proof : Suppose not. The deception  has been used, and for (t) re-
ported, the outcome a((t)) is given by rule 3. Agent k?, of type tk? receives
0 following the report (t). Agent k? can become agent i? by appropriately
announcing a di¤erent integer, and this with probability one, for every (s)
for which k?(sk?) = k?(tk?). Call him agent i?, of type ti?, following the
deviation. For (t) reported, if the outcome still falls in rule 3 following the
12A report of types (si)i2N is said to be compatible if s 2 T ?.
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change in integer, agent i? receives !i?. Since !i > 0 8i 2 N and preferences
are strongly monotonic, this is protable when (t) is reported. On the other
hand, if the outcome now falls in rule 2 when (t) is reported, this deviator
is awarded xi
?
i?. Since p(t)  0 and !i? > 0, it is the case that xi?i? > 0. By
strong monotonicity of preferences, this is protable when (t) is reported.
Now, for other (s) 6= (t) with i?(si?) = i? (ti?), if a((s)) was given
by rule 2, notice that agent k? was receiving 0 unless he was agent i? when
(s) was reported. In that case, a((s)) is now given by rule 3 following
the change in integer announced. Again this is protable when (s) is re-
ported. Otherwise, if for (s), agent k? was in fact already agent i?, then the
change in integer does not a¤ect the outcome a((s)). Finally, if a((s)) was
given by rule 1, notice that a change in integer does not a¤ect the outcome
in such a case. Therefore, this is a deviation that is interim protable. A
contradiction with m being a Bayesian Equilibrium.
A consequence of this lemma is that type-reports should always be com-
patible.
Lemma 5: For every compatible  ( = ^ or  6= ^), there does not
exists t 2 T ? such that a((t)) comes from rule 2
Proof: Suppose not. The compatible  has been used and for (t) re-
ported, a((t)) is given by rule 2. Agent j 6= i?, of type tj, receive the 0
bundle when state (t) has been reported. By modifying her integer an-
nounced, she can become agent i?, the agent with the highest integer, with
probability one, for any (s) with j(sj) = j(tj). So, call her agent i?, of
type ti?. Thus, given the rules of the game, the outcome is now given by rule
3 with probability one when (t) is reported. Therefore, given (t), agent
i? would receive !i? which dominates 0, since !i? > 0 and preferences are
strongly monotonic. For the other (s) 6= (t) for which i?(si?) = i?(ti? ),
if the outcome was initially given by rule 2, it is now either given by rule 3
thus protableor still given by rule 2 if the new agent i? was already i? for
the report (s) and thus the outcome a((s)) would remain unchanged;
or the outcome was given by rule 1, in which case, the outcome is una¤ected
by a change in the integer announced. Therefore, this deviation is interim
protable. A contradiction.
A consequence of this lemma is that equilibrium outcomes are always
given by rule 1. In equilibrium, agents always agree on a state contingent
price-allocation pair.
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Lemma 6: For every compatible  ( = ^ or  6= ^), 8i 2 N , 8ti 2 Ti,
x = x   is maximal13 in the budget sets generated by p   and !i, and
the feasibility constraints
Proof: Suppose not. The compatible  is used ( = ^ or  6= ^) and
there exists an agent i, of type ti, with report i(ti), an allocation y 6= x,
with yi(s)  ! 8s 2 T ?, ps  yi(s) = ps  !i 8s 2 T ?, and such that,
Ui(yjti) > Ui(xjti).
Agent i, of type ti has a protable deviation. She can modify the integer
she announced so as to become agent i?, the agent with the highest integer,
with probability one, and announce the state-contingent allocation y 6= x.
By the rules of the game, the outcome is given by rule 2. Therefore, given
a collective report (s), agent i? is awarded yi?((s)); and this for every
report (s) for which i?(si?) = i?(ti?). Agent i, of type ti, by playing
this deviation, obtains the expected utility dened above. This is an interim
protable deviation. A contradiction.
Lemma 7: If the environment is of private values, then for every com-
patible  (with  = ^ or  6= ^), and for every (t) 2 T ?, x((t)) is
Constrained Walrasian at t, with price p(t).
Proof: By the previous lemma, we already know that x is expected
utility maximizing over the budgets sets generated by individual endowments
and p, and the feasibility constraints. Since the environment is of private
values, for every agent i of type ti, for every (s) for which i(si) = i(ti),
xi((s)) 2 argmaxui(xi; ti) subject to Bi(p(s))jxi!. Therefore, for every
compatible , (x  ; p  ) is state-by-state Constrained Walrasian.
Q.E.D.
This lemma concludes the characterization of the set of equilibrium out-
comes. In private values environments, every equilibrium allocation rule
is state-by-state constrained Walrasian. The mechanism globally implements
the social choice correspondence for which, for every economy E 2 E , the
social choice set is composed of state-by-state CWE allocation rules. The
set of Constrained state-by-state Walrasian allocations is in general a su-
perset of the set of CREE allocations. The denition of CREE excludes
13That is, 8i, 8ti 2 Ti, x 2 argmaxxi Ui(xjti) subject to xi(t)  ! 8t 2 T , and the
budget sets generated by p and individual endowments.
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non-measurable allocations. However, a state-by-state Walrasian allocation
may not be measurable. Measurability is very strong and not meaningful in
private values settings. It excludes allocations with good welfare properties
even though agents do not really care about the state of the world. However,
assuming strict quasi-concavity of utility functions  as opposed to quasi-
concavity implies measurability of allocations with respect to prices14. The
state-by-state Walrasian correspondence and the CREE correspondence then
coincide.
For environments that do not satisfy private values, the alloca-
tion x should be a maximal element in the budget sets generated by p
and individual endowments, subject to the feasibility constraints. In fact,
in equilibrium in which agents are truthful, (x; p) is state-by-state Wal-
rasian. Therefore, in equilibria in which agents are truthful, non-fully reveal-
ing CREE cannot be equilibrium allocations unless they are state-by-state
Walrasian. The set of CREE allocations is neither a subset, nor a superset
of the set of state-by-state CWE allocations. This observation will be useful
to understand why, without measurability restrictions on allocations, CREE
allocations may fail to be supportable as a Bayesian equilibrium outcome
of the mechanism. We will show that although CREE allocations are the
best measurable state-contingent allocations that agents can obtain, given
the prices that prevail; they may not be the best state-contingent alloca-
tions that agents can obtain. Non-fully revealing CREE allocations may fail
to be state-by-state Constrained Walrasian. It is well known (for instance,
see La¤ont (1985)) that fully revealing REE are ex-post e¢ cient since every
allocation is a WE in the respective associated full information economy.
However, non-fully revealing REE may not be ex-post e¢ cient and thus not
interim e¢ cient. For private values environments, non-fully revealing REE
are also state-by-state Walrasian.
Hence, without measurability restrictions imposed on state-contingent
allocations, there are some economies for which CREE are not supportable
as a Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the mechanism. Therefore, due to the
properties of REE, measurability restrictions on allocations do not emerge
from the strategic behavior of agents. The counterexample we will use below
is based on that observation. We rst show that in every economy E 2 E
14For instance if agent i is of type ti both in state t and t0, t 6= t0, by private values
ui(; t) = ui (; t0) = ui(; ti). If pt = pt0 , by strict quasi-concavity, the bundles that
maximize ui over constrained budget sets dened by pt and pt0 are necessarily the same.
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with private values, the set of CREE is a subset of the set of equilibrium
outcomes.
Proposition 3: In private values environment economies, the set of
CREE allocations is contained in the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Proof: Suppose (p; x) is a CREE in economy E 2 E and consider the
following strategies.
Agents i, of type ti, announce (p; x; 1; ^i(ti))
i where ^i(ti) = ti 8ti 2 Ti,
i.e. agents are truthful.
We claim that these strategies are equilibrium strategies of the game
( ; E).
It is clear that a unilateral deviation triggering rule 3 is not protable
since every CREE allocation is ex-post individually rational in private values
environments. Now, can an agent gain by triggering rule 2? Since, for any
agent i 2 N , xi (t) is a maximal element in the constrained budget sets
generated by pt and !i; for every t 2 T ?, by triggering rule 2 an agent can
only obtain bundles that are at best utility equivalent to the bundles he
was receiving at x. Notice that a deviation in type is not possible since
the environment is of non-exclusive information: a unilateral deviation in
type would trigger rule 3. This cannot be protable either, as seen above.
Therefore, there are no protable deviations from these strategies.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 1: There exists economies E 2 E for which the set of Con-
strained REE is not contained in the set of Bayesian Equilibrium outcomes
of ( ; E)
Proof: The proof uses a counterexample. The economy E we consider is
a three agents economy that does not satisfy private values. It is identical to
the one constructed in example 2 (see appendix).
N = f1; 2; 3g. T1 = ft1; t01g, T2 = ft2g, and T3 = ft3; t03g. There are two
states in T ? = ft; t0g with t = (t1; t2; t3) and t0 = (t01; t2; t03). For agent 2,
q2(s) =
1
2
, s = t; t0.
u1(; t1) = 12 log x1 + 12 log x2 u1(; t01) = 13 log x1 + 23 log x2 !1 = (1; 1)
u2(; t) = 13 log x1 + 23 log x2 u2(; t0) = 23 log x1 + 13 log x2 !2 = (1; 1)
u3(; t3) = 13 log x1 + 23 log x2 u3(; t03) = 12 log x1 + 12 log x2 !3 = (1; 1)
There exists a non-revealing Constrained REE in this economy. It is given
by the following price-allocation pair:
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pt = pt0 =
 
1; 5
4

x(t) =
 
(9
8
; 9
10
);
 
9
8
; 9
10

;
 
3
4
; 6
5

x(t0) =
  
3
4
; 6
5

;
 
9
8
; 9
10

;
 
9
8
; 9
10

.
Since agents 1 and 3 receive di¤erent bundles across states, if x is an equi-
librium outcome of the mechanism, agents have to be truthful. So, suppose
we consider the strategies given in the previous proposition. Agent 2 has a
protable deviation because the mechanism does not impose measurability
restrictions on the allocations announced. As seen in example 2, allocation
x is not state-by-state Walrasian allocation at price p =
 
1; 5
4

. The interim
utility obtained from x by agent 2 is U2(xjt2) = 0:002697515. Agent 2 has a
protable deviation. He announces the highest integer, so as to be agent i?,
and proposes the allocation,
x0(t) = ((1:125; 0:9) ; (0:75; 1:2) ; (1:125; 0:9))
x0(t0) = ((0:75; 1:2); (1:5; 0:6); (0:75; 1:2)).
The allocation x0 gives an interim utility of 0:027293 to agent 2. By using
this deviation, agent 2 triggers rule 2 and is awarded x02(s) when s = t; t
0 is
reported. This is an interim protable deviation for agent 2.
Q.E.D.
What goes wrong for the inclusion of CREE in the set of equilibrium
outcomes comes from non-fully revealing CREE in non-private values envi-
ronments. This is due to the properties of such allocations. Measurabil-
ity restrictions proper to CREE do not arise from the strategic behavior of
agents. In fact, a non-fully revealing CREE allocation can typically arise
as equilibrium only through the use of deceptions, unless it is state-by-state
Walrasian. If utility functions are strictly quasi-concave, then no non-fully
revealing CREE that is not state-by-state Walrasian can be a Bayesian equi-
librium outcome.
An explanation for this is the following. At a REE, the only information
that an agent obtains, on top of his own private information, is the one
contained in the equilibrium prices. In the mechanism we use, on the other
hand, there is a higher degree of centralization: an uninformed consumer
may propose an allocation based on information that he does not have, even
after observing the aggregate trade or the equilibrium prices. This makes
sense here because information is non-exclusive. The mechanism can easily
extract the information held by the other individuals.
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As a consequence, in order to obtain achievability of the CREE corre-
spondence, we need to impose strong restrictions on the behavior of agents:
measurability restrictions on allocations proper to CREE should be incor-
porated in the outcome function. By doing so, the deviation constructed in
the counterexample is no longer possible. An agent i would be restricted, in
rule 2, to ask for state-contingent bundles that are measurable with respect
to p, that is state-contingent bundles for which if p(ti;t i) = p(ti;t0 i); then
xi(ti; t i) = xi(ti; t0 i).
3.3 Achieving and implementing the CREECorrespon-
dence
We incorporate in the mechanism the measurability restrictions on alloca-
tions that were introduced in item 2) in the denition of CREE.
The Mechanism  0:
Agents simultaneously announce a quadruple (x; p; n; ti)
i 2 APNTi.
The outcome function is:
Rule 1 : If the collection of types reported s is compatible, (x; p)i = (x; p)
for each agent i 2 N and
1) pt  xi(t) = pt  !i 8i 2 N , 8t 2 T ?, and
P
i xi(t) = ! for every t 2 T ?,
2) 8i 2 N , 8ti 2 Ti, p(t i;ti) = p(t0 i;ti) for t i 6= t0 i ) xi(t) = xi(t0);
then x(s) is implemented.
Rule 2 : If the collection of types s reported is compatible, (x; p)j = (x; p)
8j 6= i? where i? = min fi 2 N : ni  nj 8j 2 Ng and if
1) (x; p) satises the conditions presented in rule 1
2) pi
?
= p
3) xi
? 6= x
4) for agent i?, 8ti? 2 Ti?, p(t i? ;ti? ) = p(t0 i? ;ti? ) for t i? 6= t0 i? ) xi
?
i?(t) =
xi
?
i?(t
0)
5) pt  xi?i?(t) = pt  !i? 8t 2 T ?
6) xi
?
i?(t)  ! 8t 2 T ?
Then agent i? gets xi
?
i?(s) and agents j 6= i? get 0 (and the rest of the
goods is thrown away).
Rule 3 : For all other cases, everybody receives their endowment, except
agent k? = max

k 2 N : nk  nj 8j 2 N	 who receives 0.
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Proposition 4: For every E 2 E, the set of Constrained REE allocations
is contained in the set of Bayesian Equilibrium outcomes of ( 0; E).
Proof: Assume (x; p) 2 CREE(E). Then the following strategies sup-
port x as a Bayesian Equilibrium allocation rule of the game form ( 0; E):
Agents i announce (p; x; 1; ^i(ti))
i where ^i(ti) = ti 8ti 2 Ti  i.e.
agents are truthful.
We claim that these strategies are equilibrium strategies. For all t 2 T ?,
reported, the outcome is x(t) and it is given by rule 1. It is clear that a
unilateral deviation triggering rule 3 is not protable since any CREE is at
least interim individually rational (and in fact is ex-post individually rational
in the case of private values). Now, can an agent gain by triggering rule 2?
Since x is maximal given the measurability restrictionsin the budget sets
generated by p and individual endowments, by triggering rule 2, an agent
can only reach measurable bundles that are at best interim utility equivalent
to the bundles he was receiving at x. Notice that a deviation in type is not
protable since the environment is of non-exclusive information: a unilateral
deviation in type would trigger rule 3. Therefore, there are no protable
deviations from these strategies. We conclude that every Constrained REE
is supportable in a Bayesian equilibrium using the above strategies.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 2: The normal form mechanism  0 globally implements the
CREE correspondence in Bayesian Equilibrium in the class of economies E.
Proof: Given proposition 4 above, we only need to show thatBE( 0; E) 
CREE(E). Precisely, what we need to show is that if  is a Bayesian Equilib-
rium of ( 0; E), then g() 2 CREE(E). Suppose  is a Bayesian Equilibrium
and g() = a. The proof is divided in a series of lemmas.
Lemma 8: For every  ( = ^ or  6= ^), @t 2 T ? such that a((t))
comes from rule 3
Proof : Identical to the proof of lemma 4. A consequence of this lemma
is that type-reports should always be compatible.
Lemma 9: For every compatible  ( = ^ or  6= ^), @t 2 T ? such that
a((t)) comes from rule 2.
Proof : Identical to the proof of lemma 5. A consequence of this lemma is
that equilibrium outcomes are always given by rule 1. In equilibrium, agents
always agree on a state contingent price-allocation pair.
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Lemma 10: If agents are truthful (i.e.  = ^), (x; p) is a CREE.
Proof : Suppose not. The outcome is x(t) for every t 2 T ? reported, and
(p; x) is not a CREE. Notice that x is ex-post balanced, budget-balancing for
every agent, in every state; and measurable given pfor every agent i, for
every ti 2 Ti. Therefore, item 3) in the denition of CREE is not satised.
There exists an agent i, of type ti, and a state-contingent bundle yi 6= xi,
measurable, feasible and budget-balancing given p such thatX
t i2T i
qi(t ijti)ui(yi(t); t) >
X
t i2T i
qi(t ijti)ui(xi(t); t)
Agent i, of type ti, has a protable deviation. By appropriately modifying
the integer he announces, agent i can make sure to become agent i? for every
s 2 T ? for which si = ti, and this with probability one. Thus he modies his
integer announcement and announce an allocation y 6= x with yj(t) = ! yi(t)n 1
for all t 2 T ? and yi as identied above. Given the rules of the game, for
every s, with si = ti, reported, the outcome is given by rule 2. Therefore,
agent i, of type ti, is awarded yi(s) for every s reported with si = ti and thus
obtains the expected utility identied above. This is a protable deviation.
A contradiction.
Lemma 11: For all compatible deception , (x  ; p  ) is a CREE.
Proof: The proof is divided in two cases.
Case 1: (t) = s 8t 2 T ?, i.e. agents play a constant deception.
x((t)) = x(s) and p((t)) = ps 8t 2 T ?. Suppose by way of contradiction
that (x(s); ps) is not a CREE. Notice that x is ex-post balanced, budget-
balancing for every agent, in every state; and measurable given pfor every
agent i, for every ti 2 Ti. Therefore, item 3) in the denition of CREE is not
satised. There exists an agent i, of type ti, with i(ti) = si, and a bundle
yi(s) 6= xi(s), ex-post feasible and budget-balancing at ps such thatX
t i2T i
qi(t ijti)ui(yi(s); t) >
X
t i2T i
qi(t ijti)ui(xi(s); t)
Agent i, of type ti, has a protable deviation. By appropriately modifying
the integer he announces, agent i can make sure to become agent i?. He
modies his integer announcement and announce an allocation y 6= x along
with p. The allocation y is constructed as follows. In allocation y, xi(s) is
replaced by the bundle yi(s) identied above. For j 6= i, yj(s) = ! yi(s)n 1 . In
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order to satisfy measurability restrictions on yi, if p(s) = p(s0) for s0 6= s,
with s0i = si (where si = i(ti)), then yi(s
0) = yi(s). For all states s0 6= s
with i(ti) 6= s0i, yi(s0) = xi(s0). Again, for simplicity, yj(s0) = ! yi(s
0)
n 1 8j 6= i,8s0 6= s.
Given the rules of the game, for every s reported, with si = ti, the outcome
is given by rule 2. Therefore, agent i, of type ti, is awarded yi(s) for every
(t) = (:::; i(ti); :::) reported with i(ti) = si and thus obtains the expected
utility identied above. This is a protable deviation. A contradiction.
Case 2:  is a non-constant compatible deception. Suppose (x; p) is an-
nounced, and the compatible deception  is used. The equilibrium allocation
rule is x with price p. Suppose by way of contradiction that (x; p) is not
a CREE. Notice that since x is a measurable allocation with respect to p,
it implies that x is measurable with respect to p. Now, since x is ex-post
balanced and budget-balancing for every agent, in every state, condition 3) in
the denition of CREE cannot be satised. There exists an agent i, of type ti,
and a state-contingent bundle yi, measurable, feasible and budget-balancing
given p, such thatX
t i2T i
qi(t ijti)ui(yi(t); t) >
X
t i2T i
qi(t ijti)ui(xi((t); t).
Agent i has a protable deviation. By appropriately modifying the inte-
ger he announces, agent i can make sure to become agent i? for every state
s 2 T ?, reported for which i(ti) = si. Thus he modies his integer an-
nouncement and announce an allocation z 6= x along with p. The allocation
z is constructed as follows.
The allocation z is constructed so that zi((t)) = yi(t) 8(t), such that
(t) = s and i(ti) = si. Given (t) = s with i(ti) = si, if ps0 = ps with
s0 6= s and i(ti) = s0i, then zi(s0) = zi(s) = yi(t) by measurability. Now, for
states s such that i(ti) 6= si, zi(s) = xi(s). For every agent j 6= i, for every
t 2 T ?, zj(t) = ! zi(t)n 1 .
The state-contingent bundles zi are measurable with respect to p. To
summarize, the construction we have just done for agent i is:
zi(s) = xi(s) for all s such that i(ti) 6= si.
zi(s) = yi(t) for all s for which (t) = s and i(ti) = si.
zi(s
0) = zi(s) for all s0 such that ps0 = ps, s0 6= (t) 8t 2 T ?, and
i(ti) = s
0
i.
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Hence, an ex-post feasible, budget balancing and measurable allocation z
for agent i of type ti, can be constructed. It has the property that z((s)) =
y(s) 8(s) with i(ti) = i(si). Thus, allocation z gives to agent i of type
ti, the interim utility given that  is played
Ui(z  jti) = Ui(yjti) > Ui(x  jti).
The outcome is given by rule 2. Agent i, of type ti is awarded zi((s)),
8(s) for which i(si) = i(ti). He obtains the interim utility above. This
is an interim protable deviation. A contradiction with m being a Bayesian
Equilibrium.
The proof is now complete. We have shown that every CREE can be
supported as a Bayesian Equilibrium outcome of the mechanism, and that
every equilibrium allocation rule should be a CREE. We obtain a full imple-
mentation of the CREE correspondence.
Q.E.D.
The mechanism we initially designed for complete information describes
well, to some extent, the Walrasian story. Agents report prices and allo-
cations, and if what they agree on is not optimal, one specic agent is
allowed to maximize her utility over the budget set generated by the price
vector collectively reported and her endowment, subject to the feasibility
constraint. The extension of the CWE correspondence can coincide with the
CREE correspondence.
We think that our result allows a better understanding of the game-
theoretic foundations of CREE in the context of the implementation litera-
ture. It rst shows that in order to at least achieve the Constrained REE
correspondence with such a mechanism, the measurability restrictions on al-
locations cannot be dispensed with and should be imposed in the outcome
function. Moreover, it also examines and establishes game-theoretic connec-
tions between WE and REE. It provides some support to the point of view
that REE is an extension of WE to di¤erential economies. However, in con-
nection with the last section, this result is mitigated by the strong restrictions
that needs to be imposed on the behavior of agents. In fact, is it so natural
to impose measurability restrictions in our context?
To conclude this section, we present an example that illustrates the result.
We construct an example of an economy with three agents and show that if
a deception  is played and (x , p ) is not a constrained REE, then this
allocation cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
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Example 1:
N = f1; 2; 3g ; T1 = (t1; t01), Ti = (ti; t0i; t00i ), i = 2; 3.
T ? = ft1; t2; t3; t4; t5g, with t1 = (t1; t2; t3), t2 = (t1; t02; t03),t3 = (t1; t002; t003),
t4 = (t01; t
0
2; t3) and t
5 = (t01; t2; t
0
3). Each agent has an endowment of 1 unit
of each good. The states are equally likely.
u1(; t1) = 13 log x1 + 23 log x2 u1(; t2) = 12 log x1 + 12 log x2
u1(; t3) = 23 log x1 + 13 log x2 u1(; t01) = 13 log x1 + 23 log x2
u2(; t2) = 12 log x1 + 12 log x2 u2(; t02) = 13 log x1 + 23 log x2
u2(; t002) = 23 log x1 + 13 log x2 u3(; t3) = 13 log x1 + 23 log x2
u3(; t03) = 12 log x1 + 12 log x2 u3(; t003) = 23 log x1 + 13 log x2
Consider the following REE:
p(t1;t2;t3) = pt1 = (1;
11
7
) x(t1) = ((6
7
; 12
11
); (9
7
; 9
11
); (6
7
; 12
11
))
p(t1;t02;t03) = pt2 = (1;
5
4
) x(t2) = ((9
8
; 9
10
); (3
4
; 6
5
); (9
8
; 9
10
))
p(t1;t002 ;t003 ) = pt3 = (1;
1
2
) x(t3) = ((1; 1); (1; 1); (1; 1))
p(t01;t02;t3) = pt4 = (1; 2) x(t
4) = ((1; 1); (1; 1); (1; 1))
p(t01;t2;t03) = pt5 = (1;
5
4
) x(t5) = ((3
4
; 6
5
); (9
8
; 9
10
); (9
8
; 9
10
))
Suppose agents announce (x; p; 1), rule 1 applies and they play the fol-
lowing deception:
Agent 1 1(t1) = t01 1(t
0
1) = t1
Agent 2 2(t2) = t02 2(t
0
2) = t2 2(t
00
2) = t
0
2
Agent 3 3(t3) = t3 3(t03) = t
0
3 3(t
00
3) = t3
This generates the following compatible deception :
(t1) = t4, (t2) = t5, (t3) = t4, (t4) = t1 and (t5) = t2.
The allocation rule generated by  is (x  ; p  ),
p(t1;t2;t3) = p(t1) = (1; 2) x((t
1)) = ((1; 1); (1; 1); (1; 1))
p(t1;t02;t03) = p(t2) = (1;
5
4
) x((t2)) = ((3
4
; 6
5
); (9
8
; 9
10
); (9
8
; 9
10
))
p(t1;t002 ;t003 ) = p(t3) = (1; 2) x((t
3)) = ((1; 1); (1; 1); (1; 1))
p(t01;t02;t3) = p(t4) = (1;
11
7
) x((t4)) = ((6
7
; 12
11
); (9
7
; 9
11
); (6
7
; 12
11
))
p(t01;t2;t03) = p(t5) = (1;
5
4
) x((t5)) = ((9
8
; 9
10
); (3
4
; 6
5
); (9
8
; 9
10
))
Consider agent 1, of type t1. The allocation x  gives him the following
expected utility of U1(x  jt1) =  0:0228: Therefore, x   cannot be a
CREE since it is not even interim individually rational for agent 1, of type
t1. Construct the following measurable bundles over states t1, t2 and t3, given
p  ; feasible and budget-balancing at prices p(t1), p(t3), p(t3):
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y1(t
1) = (3
2
; 3
4
) y1(t
2) = (9
8
; 9
10
) y1(t
3) = (3
2
; 3
4
)
The interim utility obtained from these bundles by agent 1, of type t1, is
0:018 >  0:0228. Therefore, there exists measurable bundles, given p  ,
that agent 1, of type t1, would prefer to getting x. Agent 1, of type t1 has
a protable deviation. He can construct the following measurable allocation
z 6= x, now, measurable given p. We construct the allocation in such
a way that it is actually measurable for every agent. Given rule 2, we need
only construct it so that the bundles that agent i? receives are measurable
with respect to p.
p(t1;t2;t3) = pt1 = (1;
11
7
) z(t1) = x(t1) = ((6
7
; 12
11
); (9
7
; 9
11
); (6
7
; 12
11
))
p(t1;t02;t03) = pt2 = (1;
5
4
) z(t2) = x(t2) = ((9
8
; 9
10
); (3
4
; 6
5
); (9
8
; 9
10
))
p(t1;t002 ;t003 ) = pt3 = (1;
1
2
) z(t3) = x(t3) = ((1; 1); (1; 1); (1; 1))
p(t01;t02;t3) = pt4 = (1; 2) z(t
4) = y(t1) = y(t3) = ((3
2
; 3
4
); (3
4
; 9
8
); (3
4
; 9
8
))
p(t01;t2;t03) = pt5 = (1;
5
4
) z(t5) = y(t2) = ((9
8
; 9
10
); (3
4
; 6
5
); (9
8
; 9
10
))
Agent 1 can announce a higher integer and be agent i?, the agent with the
highest integer. Announcing allocation z constructed above, agent 1, of type
t1, triggers rule 2 and obtains bundles z1((s)) = y1(s) for s = t1; t2; t3. This
gives him the expected utility calculated above. Therefore, the deviation is
protable.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have taken a di¤erent approach than what is usually studied
in the implementation literature. Using an elementary mechanism, similar
to the one constructed in DSV, we followed an approach that had been used
in the recent literature on Shapley-Shubik strategic market games. The goal
was to understand if one could draw game-theoretic connections between WE
and REE using an elementary mechanism.
By extending the mechanism we designed, the properties of equilibrium
allocation rules were very close to the description of CREE allocations. How-
ever, we rst showed that the measurability restrictions on allocations proper
to REE do not emerge naturally from the behavior of agents: there exists
economies for which the set of CREE allocations is not contained in the
set of Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism. Next, by impos-
ing these measurability restrictions in the outcome function, the mechanism
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globally implemented the CREE correspondence. The result provides sup-
port for REE as an extension of WE to economies with di¤erential informa-
tion. However, this conclusion is obtained at the price of strong restrictions
on the behavior of agents. Is it so natural to impose measurability in our
context? In addition, the result in the last section can be viewed as an in-
teresting result on its own since it provides an appealing mechanism to fully
Bayesian implement the CREE correspondence.
Several extensions of this work can be considered. First, what would
happen to our conclusions if we followed an approach similar to the one used
in Forges and Minelli (1997)? That is, instead of modifying the mechanism
we had for complete information, we could keep it as it is and add to it
a communication stage in which agents privately report their types to the
mediator and the mediator in turn reports a price if the collection of report
is compatible. We conjecture that the CREE correspondence is obtained as
self-fullling equilibria of our mechanism. However, notice that in each self-
fullling equilibrium, agents are truthful. Like in Forges and Minelli (1997),
we would have some unwanted Bayesian equilibria. On the other hand, our
result in the last section is a full Bayesian implementation result of the CREE
correspondence.
Finally, we could repeat the game several periods and keep the message
spaces unchanged when switching from complete to incomplete information.
By doing so, we would explicitly incorporate issue of information transmission
in the model. A natural question that would arise is to analyze the di¤erence
between the game being repeated a nite number of periods and innitely.
We leave answers to these questions open for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of theorem 1 :
We begin by showing that CW (E)  NE( ; E)
Suppose x 2 CW (E) with associated walrasian price vector p. Then
the following strategies support x as a Nash Equilibrium outcome of the
game form ( ; E):
Every agent i announces (x; p; 1)i.
The outcome xis given by rule 1. It is easy to see that there are
no protable deviation from these strategies. First, by unilaterally devi-
ating and triggering rule 3, an agent can at best receive her endowment.
Since Constrained Walrasian Equilibrium are individually rational, this is
not protable. Second, by announcing xi 6= x, feasible and budget bal-
ancing at p, and the highest integer, any agent i can become i? and make
the outcome to fall into rule 2. Since (x; p) is a Constrained Walrasian
equilibrium, any such xi
?
gives to agent i, ui(xi
?
i?)  ui(xi?). Therefore,
xi? 2 argmaxBi? (p) ui?(xi?) for every xi?  !, thus agent i? cannot gain by
getting x0i? 6= xi? along the hyperplane with normal p.
Therefore, the proposed strategies constitute a Nash Equilibrium. g(m) =
x and x 2 NE( ; E).
We prove now that NE( ; E)  CW (E). What we need to show is that
if m is a Nash Equilibrium of ( ; E), then g(m) 2 CW (E). Suppose m is
a Nash Equilibrium such that mi = (x; p; n)i and g(m) = a. The proof is
divided in a series of lemma.
Lemma 1: There are no equilibrium in rule 3
Proof : Suppose not. Agent k? receives 0. By modifying the integer
he announced and possibly his price announcement in order to keep the
outcome in rule 3 this agent can make sure, given the strategies of the
other players, not to be agent k? and therefore to receive his endowment.
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By strong monotonicity of preferences and since !i > 0 8i 2 N , this is a
protable deviation. A contradiction.
Lemma 2: There are no equilibrium in rule 2
Proof : Suppose not. Every agent j 6= i? receives 0. By modifying the
integer she announced, agent j 6= i? can make sure not to receive 0. Suppose
she announces the highest integer. The outcome is now given by rule 3
and she receives her endowment. Since !i > 0 8i 2 N and preferences are
strongly monotonic, this is a protable deviation. A contradiction.
Lemma 3: (x; p) is a Constrained Walrasian Equilibrium
Proof : Suppose not. (x; p) is announced by all the agents, the equilibrium
is given by rule 1 and (x; p) is not a Constrained Walrasian Equilibrium.
By denition of a Constrained Walrasian Equilibrium, there exists an agent
i 2 N , and an allocation x0 2 A, with p  x0i = p  !i such that
ui(x
0
i) > ui(xi)
Agent i has a protable deviation. Agent i announces the highest integer
so as to be agent i? and the allocation x0. The outcome is then determined
by rule 2. Given rule 2, agent i = i? is awarded x0i?. This is a protable
deviation. A contradiction.
The proof is now complete. We have established existence of Nash equi-
librium outcome that are constrained Walrasian, and then proved that every
equilibrium outcome should be constrained Walrasian.
Q.E.D.
Some Welfare properties of REE:
Example 2: Constrained REE allocations may not be ex-post individu-
ally rational
N = f1; 2; 3g. T1 = ft1; t01g, T2 = ft2g, and T3 = ft3; t03g. There are two
states in T ? = ft; t0g with t = (t1; t2; t3) and t0 = (t01; t2; t03)
u1(; t1) = 12 log x1 + 12 log x2 u1(; t01) = 13 log x1 + 23 log x2 !1 = (1; 1)
u2(; t) = 13 log x1 + 23 log x2 u2(; t0) = 23 log x1 + 13 log x2 !2 = (1; 1)
u3(; t3) = 13 log x1 + 23 log x2 u3(; t03) = 12 log x1 + 12 log x2 !3 = (1; 1)
and q2(s) = 12 , s = t; t
0.
There exists a non-revealing Constrained REE in this economy. It is given
by the following price-allocation pair:
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pt = pt0 =
 
1; 5
4

x(t) =
 
(9
8
; 9
10
);
 
9
8
; 9
10

;
 
3
4
; 6
5

x(t0) =
  
3
4
; 6
5

;
 
9
8
; 9
10

;
 
9
8
; 9
10

This allocation is not ex-post individually rational for agent 2 in state t.
Receiving the endowment gives an ex-post utility of 0 to agent 2. However,
it gives a utility of u2(x; t) =  0:02172.
Example 3: Constrained REE allocations may not be state-by-state-
Walrasian
Consider the economy described in example 2. Allocation x is not state-
by-state Walrasian at prices p =
 
1; 5
4

. Obviously, since agent 1 and 3 are
informed, every state-contingent bundles they would prefer are not a¤ordable
at p. But the constant bundle received by agent 2 does not correspond to
what he would ask for in state t and t0, had he known the state. Consider
state t. The (ex-post) Walrasian demand for agent 2, at p, is x02(t) =
 
3
4
; 6
5

.
The same applies for state t0 with x02(t
0) =
 
6
5
; 3
4

. Agent 2 would obtain a
strictly greater expected utility.
Example 4: Constrained REE allocations may not be interim e¢ cient
N = f1; 2; 3; 4g. T1 = ft1; t01g, T2 = ft2; t02g T3 = ft3g, and T4 =
ft4g. There are two states in T ? = ft; t0g with t = (t1; t2; t3; t4) and t0 =
(t01; t
0
2; t3; t4)
u1(; t1) = x u1(; t01) = 2x !1 = 1
u2(; t2) = 2x u2(; t02) = x !2 = 1
u3(; t) =
p
x u3(; t0) =
p
2x !3 = 1
u4(; t) =
p
2x u4(; t0) =
p
x !4 = 1
Agents 3 and 4 di¤er in their probability assessment over the states t
and t0. For agent 2, q2(t) = 13 , q2(t
0) = 2
3
; while for agent 3, q3(t) = 23 and
q3(t
0) = 1
3
There exists a unique REE. It is non-revealing. Agents keep
their endowments and p = 1 in both state. Agents 1 and 2, being informed,
do not wish to trade: individual rationality implies that they receive their
endowment since there is only one good. However, this allocation is not in-
terim e¢ cient. Agent 3 and 4 could exploit the di¤erence in their probability
assessments over the state of the world. The allocation x0(t) = (1; 1; 0:9; 1:1),
x0(t0) = (1; 1; 1:1; 0:9) interim dominates allocation x.
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